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The posterior parietal lobes have been implicated in a range of episodic memory retrieval
tasks, but the nature of parietal contributions to remembering remains unclear. In an
attempt to identify fruitful avenues of further research, several heuristic questions about
parietal mnemonic activations are considered in light of recent empirical findings: Do
such parietal activations reflect memory processes, or their contents? Do they precede,
follow, or co-occur with retrieval? What can we learn from their pattern of lateralization?
Do they index access to episodic representations, or the feeling of remembering? Are
parietal activations graded by memory strength, quantity of retrieved information, or the
type of retrieval? How do memory-related activations map onto functional parcellation of
parietal lobes suggested by other cognitive phenomena? Consideration of these questions
can promote understanding of the relationship between parietal mnemonic effects and
perceptual, attentional, and action-oriented cognitive processes.
Keywords: memory, parietal, fMRI, EEG, retrieval, recollection, familiarity, attention
TOWARDS AN UNDERSTANDING OF PARIETAL
MNEMONIC PROCESSES: CONCEPTUAL QUESTIONS
A host of recent neuroimaging studies have documented the
activation of areas of the posterior parietal cortex (PPC) during
episodic memory retrieval (reviewed, inter alia, by Wagner et al.,
2005; Skinner and Fernandez, 2007; Hutchinson et al., 2009;
Spaniol et al., 2009; Kim, 2012). These findings converge with
earlier electrophysiological studies that had reported event-related
potentials recorded over parietal scalp that index episodic recog-
nition (reviewed by Friedman and Johnson, 2000; Mecklinger,
2000; Rugg and Curran, 2007). One upshot of those neuroimag-
ing studies is that medial parietal regions, including retrosplenial
cortex, the precuneus, and posterior cingulate cortex, which are
strongly interconnected with medial temporal lobe regions (Kahn
et al., 2008), are activated in retrieval tasks; this accords with
earlier clinical findings that damage to medial parietal areas may
yield “retrosplenial amnesia” (Valenstein et al., 1987), a diagnos-
tic category that should be understood as referring to memory
impairments resulting from damage to themedial parietal regions
in general (Aggleton, 2010). This interconnection has been more
recently understood in light of all these areas forming part of the
default mode network (DMN) (Raichle et al., 2001), which will be
discussed below. Slightly more surprising in light of conventional
neuropsychological wisdom were the reports of lateral parietal
mnemonic activations. It is still unclear whether neuropsycho-
logical findings (e.g., Berryhill et al., 2007, 2009; Haramati et al.,
2008; Simons et al., 2008, 2010; Schoo et al., 2011), are in conso-
nance with the implication by neuroimaging of the parietal cortex
in mnemonic processes, as lateral parietal damage does not seem
to cause significant mnemonic impairments. However, even if
intact lateral parietal cortices are not absolutely necessary for
retrieval success, the nature of the lateral parietal activations
engendered in connection with remembering is in need of
explication. A number of explanations of lateral parietal
mnemonic functions have been offered, but no single account
offered to date seems to successfully explain the full range of em-
pirical evidence, from a variety of paradigms, regarding this issue.
In the present article, I would like to examine several concep-
tual questions regarding relationships between memory, percep-
tion, attention, and action that are raised or emphasized by the
parietal mnemonic issue, focusing specifically on findings regard-
ing lateral parietal cortices. Several detailed scholarly reviews and
meta-analyses of relevant studies have recently been published
(e.g., Hutchinson et al., 2009; Uncapher andWagner, 2009; Schoo
et al., 2011; Kim, 2012), providing a database of findings upon
which I will rely in framing the issues under examination. What
follows is far from exhaustive, and reflects a mid-course effort to
put some parts of the parietal mnemonic literature into a frame-
work that might inform future empirical studies. At the risk of
oversimplification, it might be heuristically helpful to consider
the parietal mnemonic issue in light of a mosaic of several basic
questions. These are: Do parietal mnemonic activations reflect
memory processes, or the representation of the contents of mem-
ory? Are they indicative of pre-retrieval, retrieval, or post-retrieval
processes? Are they related to the veridicality ofmemory? Are they
primarilymodulated by strength, quality (e.g., item vs. source), or
quantity of retrieved information? Are they fundamentally later-
alized or bilateral in nature? Do they represent parietal regions’
membership in cognitive control, selective attention, or DMNs?
In the following sections we will address these questions.
PROCESSES OR CONTENTS?
Do mnemonically related activations indicate that lateral parietal
cortices are loci of stored representations, or are they a substrate
of intrinsic or ancillary retrieval processes? Current accounts of
parietal mnemonic function may be categorized by how they
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answer that question. As the parietal areas that have been impli-
cated in retrieval processes consist of a number of cytoarchi-
tectonic and functional areas, multiple mnemonic functions are
possible according to each account. The Mnemonic Accumulator
model (Wagner et al., 2005; Donaldson et al., 2010) suggests that
parietal activations during retrieval reflect the accumulation of
a match signal between a recognition probe and representations
stored elsewhere in the brain. The probe is judged to be old if that
accumulated signal exceeds a certain threshold. Therefore, in this
view, parietal mnemonic activations reflect processes intrinsic to
retrieval. However, such signal accumulation is also posited to be
part of perceptual judgment processes (Ploran et al., 2007), so the
function is not specifically mnemonic. A related proposal is that
inferior lateral parietal activation reflects expectations regarding
the mnemonic status of a presented item, rather than sensitiv-
ity to the strength of a mnemonic trace (O’Connor et al., 2010;
Buchsbaum et al., 2011). This Expectation approach, too, is a
process function account.
The Attention-to-Memory (AtoM) account (Cabeza et al., 2008,
2011; Ciaramelli et al., 2008, 2010) explains parietal activations
as reflecting attentional processes ancillary to retrieval: either
top-down attention to cues preceding retrieval, or bottom-up
capture of attention by retrieval output or the retrieval cue. In this
account, activity in superior parietal cortices, ranging from the
intraparietal sulcus (IPS) up to superior medial parietal regions,
roughly the area of Brodmann Area (BA) 7, is posited to reflect
top-down focal attention especially important for challenging
retrieval tasks, while anterior inferior lateral parietal activations
(in the vicinity of the supramarginal gyrus, overlapping BA
40) is explained as reflecting bottom-up capture of attention
by easily accessed rich memoranda (Cabeza et al., 2008, 2011).
In other words, this is a process account, but one that posits
that the activations represent processes that are not intrinsically
mnemonic.
In contrast to that attentional focus, posterior inferior parietal
cortex in the vicinity of the angular gyrus (AG; BA 39) is not an
area that has been implicated in attention systems, and therefore
seems to require a different account—such as the Cortical Binding
of Relational Activation (CoBRA) hypothesis (Shimamura, 2011;
a related proposal is found in Vilberg and Rugg, 2008b), which
focuses specifically on that region. In that model, ventral parietal
cortex in the vicinity of AG is said to provide a stable sub-
strate of representation for consolidated higher-level perceptual
information—a content function.
Finally, in the Output Buffer (Vilberg and Rugg, 2007,
2008a,b, 2009; Guerin and Miller, 2011) and the Memory-to-
Action models, (Haramati et al., 2008), ventral parietal areas
are postulated to support temporary post-retrieval represen-
tations. The Output Buffer account, based on a similar role
played by the Episodic Buffer, a proposed component of work-
ing memory (Baddeley, 2000), posits that left lateral inferior
parietal cortex supports the representation or maintenance of
retrieved episodic information—a content function. Proponents
of this view (Vilberg and Rugg, 2009) complement the pro-
posal by suggesting that more dorsal activations, especially in
the middle (horizontal) segment of the left IPS, is respon-
sive to the relative salience of retrieval cues associated with
target information—a process function. The Memory-to-Action
model (Haramati et al., 2008) is an extension of theOutput Buffer
model. Inspired by findings that extensive left ventral parietal
lesions caused no impairment on recognition tasks that had
yielded robust activations in those same areas, it postulates that
ventral parietal areas are primarily important for maintenance
of retrieved episodic information, in a format amenable to addi-
tional processing to guide subsequent behavior—a post-retrieval
content function. In contrast to other models, the Memory-
to-Action hypothesis postulates that ventral parietal activations
represent post-retrieval processes exclusively, and therefore pre-
dicts that lesions in the areas identified by neuroimaging studies
will not yield retrieval deficits per se, but may yield deficits in
subsequent processing utilizing the retrieved information.
Among the process-focused accounts, the Accumulator
account (Wagner et al., 2005; Donaldson et al., 2010) is based on
a ramified model of recognition memory (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff
and Starns, 2009), and evidence that posterior parietal areas
serve an accumulator function in perceptual decision-making
(Ploran et al., 2007). What is said to be accumulated is a signal
indicating “the amount of evidence that retrieval cue corre-
sponds to a studied item” (e.g., Okada et al., 2012). However,
this account seems to limit the parietal role in ecphory to
recognition. Similarly, the Expectation account (O’Connor et al.,
2010; Buchsbaum et al., 2011), which focuses on violation and
confirmation of the mnemonic strength of the probe, would seem
to be specific to the recognition process. This is problematic,
as lateral parietal areas seem to be implicated in cued recall no
less than in recognition. Because of methodological reasons,
the majority of studies of parietal mnemonic function have
employed recognition as the memory assay. However, cued recall
studies extant in the literature (e.g., Allan and Rugg, 1997; de
Zubicaray et al., 2007; Seibert et al., 2011a,b; Hayama et al.,
2012; Okada et al., 2012) indicate that similar activations are
found under those conditions as in recognition; we have recently
confirmed that finding in an electroencephalographic (EEG)
study of cued recall of cross-modal and unimodal pair associate
learning (Levy, unpublished data). Since in successful cued
recall there is no probe to be recognized (there is a cue, but in
principle it may be stipulated to be old, and no judgment is made
on it), accumulation of a probe-representation match signal
is not task-relevant for retrieval success. Even if recognition
of the probe does occur automatically, that is insufficient to
successfully recall the target information. Such findings challenge
the Accumulator and Expectation hypotheses. It has recently been
proposed that the accumulator function should be assigned to
mid-IPS regions (Suzuki et al., 2011; Okada et al., 2012), or more
generally to dorsal parietal regions in BA 40 (Huijbers et al.,
2010). Accordingly, the signal accumulation process and its IPS
substrate might theoretically be partially dissociated from recol-
lective and cued recall processes that lead to activations of AG.
Weighing in against such a dissociation are findings of mid-IPS
activation in cued recall (Okada et al., 2012). Furthermore, the
finding of Guerin and Miller (2011) that activation in several
parietal retrieval success areas (precuneus, AG, and IPS) track
the strength of face picture memories rather than the decision
criterion used in the memory task (in that study, a frequency
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judgment) may also be seen as challenging the assignment of an
accumulator function to IPS.
One possible modification of the Accumulator model in light
of the CoBRA account might provide a solution to a more
general conundrum regarding recognition memory. Recognition
requires the prior existence of neural ensembles representing tar-
get stimuli. Those ensembles were perceptually activated during
acquisition, and achieve representational integrity—binding into
a coherent stored representation of a perceptual experience—
by Hebbian processes, initially mediated by the medial temporal
lobes but later achieving independence through systems consol-
idation (Dudai, 2004). Recognition is executed by the compar-
ison of such stored representations with a recognition probe.
This putative process seems problematic: if the same neural
ensemble that was activated during the perceptual acquisition
of a memory trace of a given stimulus is also activated by
a recognition probe (which is the identical or a very similar
stimulus), how are the probe and trace ensembles simultane-
ously maintained for comparison? This is especially difficult to
understand if the comparison occurs over time, as suggested
by the Accumulator account, since that would seem to involve
more complex comparative processes than basic repetition sup-
pression implicated in perceptual priming (Henson and Rugg,
2003). CoBRA (Shimamura, 2011) posits that AG is a mul-
timodal perceptual convergence zone supporting consolidated
representations (but not representation during initial acquisi-
tion); successful recognition recruits the stored representations.
Thus, cortical perceptual neural ensembles earlier in the percep-
tual stream can provide a substrate for a recognition probe, while
the AG ensemble might represent the stored memory trace to
which it is compared.
A related alternative is that AG might serve as a convergence
zone for exogenous recognition probe perceptual inputs which
activate more primary perceptual areas and endogenous repre-
sentations provided by the hippocampus, in order to allow com-
parisons of perceived and retrieved representations. The degree of
overlap between the representations could determine the degree
of activation of the AG ensemble. That differential signal could be
“read” by another neural ensemble (an accumulator ensemble)
that is responsible for a judgment of recognition. That monitor-
ing function might be the provenance of prefrontal areas assigned
monitoring functions in mnemonic processes (Moscovitch and
Winocur, 2002).
The CoBRA account stresses the ability of AG to support
multimodal representations, but such a system could support uni-
modal recognition as needed. A recognition process that can take
advantage of the multimodal integrative abilities of AG would
provide the most versatile mechanism for ecological recognition.
Furthermore, the ability to support integrative multimodal rep-
resentations could provide the basis for recollective recognition,
as well as of cued and free recall of unimodal or multimodal
information.
MacKenzie and Donaldson (2009) note that parietal activa-
tions are often posited to reflect material-independent retrieval
because they have been observed across stimulus types—words,
line drawings, object pictures, landscape/object compound stim-
uli, and sounds. A similar notion is put forward by Donaldson
et al. (2010), who go on to suggest that the parietal areas gener-
ically accumulate evidence rather than serving as a basis of
representations. In contrast, the CoBRA account proposes that
the lateral parietal regions are activated across material types not
because they provide a signal accumulation function, but because
of their multimodal integrative capacity.
Some support for the CoBRA concept is offered by a case
study of a patient with cerebrovascular accident lesions limited
to the vicinity of left AG, who was specifically impaired relative
to controls in cued recall memory for cross-modal pair associate
learning, while exhibiting intact performance on unimodal verbal
pair associate learning (Levy, 2010).
The multimodality of representations in AG may explain the
findings of Buchsbaum et al. (2011) in a study of recency effects
in short-term verbal continuous recognition. They report that an
area in middle inferior PPC which exhibited declining activity
with increasing presentation-test lag was not active during verbal
working memory maintenance, while such maintenance-related
activity was found in the more anterior area Sylvian-parietal-
temporal (Spt). This finding is taken as indicating that middle
inferior parietal activations (themselves dissociated from a yet
more posterior region identified with default mode activity) are
unlikely to reflect retrieval-related maintenance as assumed by
Output Buffer account. However, in Buchsbaum et al. (2011), the
Spt area was identified using a Sternberg-type working mem-
ory task for letters, stressing verbal rehearsal and phonological
characteristics, which is unlikely to activate the full range of mul-
timodal stimulus features supported by AG as proposed by the
CoBRA or Output Buffer accounts. Working memory mainte-
nance for more complex stimuli, whether novel or drawn from
long-term stores, might recruit AG as well.
In evaluating the CoBRA hypothesis, it must be noted that
Sestieri et al. (2011), using a movie-based cued recollection
paradigm which involves multimodal integration, report that AG
was active during retrieval, but that same area was deactivated
during a perceptual search task that used very similar materials,
as would be expected by the inclusion of AG in the Default Mode
Network (see below, “Cognitive Control, Selective Attention, or
Default Mode?”). This would indicate that AG is not involved in
the basic representation of perceptual information as suggested
by CoBRA.
An alternative explanation of the activation of AG by retrieval
is the Memory-to-Action hypothesis (Haramati et al., 2008),
which, as mentioned above, is an extension of the Output Buffer
hypothesis. Memory-to-Action is inspired by consideration of two
processes in which parietal cortex has been shown to play an
important role. The first is in the organization of information
for the execution of serial tasks—the capacity which is impaired
in ideomotor apraxia, a deficit often linked with left posterior
ventral parietal damage (Wheaton and Hallett, 2007). The sec-
ond point of departure is the complementary roles of parietal
and hippocampal regions in navigation. In both animal and
human studies, navigation based on allocentric spatial informa-
tion has been linked to hippocampal substrates, while navigation
based on egocentric spatial information has been connected with
parietal cortices (Weniger et al., 2009). In fact, Weniger and col-
leagues (2009) report that in persons with unilateral parietal
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cortex lesions, egocentric memory expressed in navigation in a
virtual environment is impaired, while allocentric, hippocampal-
based navigation memory is spared. Importantly, in rodent stud-
ies it has been shown these two entities are not two separate
representations, but reflect a transformation of allocentric to ego-
centric versions of spatial memory which enables the animal
to move through the environment (Whitlock et al., 2008). In
rodents, the hippocampus is primarily important for the rep-
resentation of spatial information, but in humans its function
seems to have developed to accommodate episodic informa-
tion in general. The Memory-to-Action account speculates that
the hippocampal-parietal translation of spatial information in
rodents suggests hippocampal-parietal translation of episodic
information in humans. Under ecological conditions, the func-
tion of retrieved memories is to support action in the environ-
ment. Remembering the identity, position, and temporal qualities
of features of the world enables us to act efficiently. For this pur-
pose, recognized and recalled items have more intrinsic value
(and hence continue to be represented in the buffer) than stim-
uli that are judged to be novel, since known entities can constrain
the degrees of freedom of potential action, while unknown enti-
ties provide less guidance for behavior. Similarly, high confidence
memory judgments, being subjectively more reliable in guid-
ing behavior, are more likely to lead to post-retrieval buffering
than low-confidence judgments; this is in consonance with recent
findings (Hayes et al., 2011) that ventral parietal cortex is more
strongly activated by high- than by low-confidence endorsements,
both for item memory and for item plus source memory. AG
might provide a buffer dedicated to translation of memoranda
to action-oriented representations. Aside from explaining the AG
activations by episodic retrieval, this account addresses the find-
ings that damage to lateral parietal areas do not generally cause
mnemonic impairments in the same tasks that lead to the activa-
tion of those areas (Schoo et al., 2011). The process of recognition
depends on other substrates; after recognition has happened, AG
enters the process, so lesions would be expected to affect the sub-
sequent use of retrieved information rather than the retrieval
itself. Further research is required into parietal lesion effects on
utilization of memory in guidance of subsequent action in order
to assess the explanatory utility of this Memory-to-Action model.
This proposal converges with a recent account of the centrality
of AG in semantic memory (Binder and Desai, 2011). Based on
evidence they cite that AG responds strongly to concrete, high-
frequency words and meaningful sentences, Binder and Desai
(2011) conclude that the level of AG activation seems to reflect
the amount of semantic information that can be successfully
retrieved from a given input. Furthermore, they point out that,
if considered as a convergence zone, “AG is notably bounded by
dorsal attention networks that play a central role in spatial cog-
nition, anterior parietal regions concerned with representation
of action and posterior temporal regions supporting movement
perception. This suggests that the AG may play a unique role
in representation of event concepts” (Binder and Desai, 2011,
p. 533). Supporting an action-oriented representation of infor-
mation drawn from episodic memory may be yet another aspect
of representational convergence afforded by such a transmodal
association area (Mesulam, 1998).
TIMING: PRE-RETRIEVAL, RETRIEVAL, OR POST-RETRIEVAL?
An additional taxonomy of accounts of parietal mnemonic func-
tion can be constructed using a temporal framework. For exam-
ple, the implication of the AtoM account is that the dorsal and
ventral parietal foci of retrieval-related activity should be found in
two different time windows. The dorsal/superior parietal regions,
implicated in focal top-down attention, need to be engaged pre-
ceding the actual retrieval, while the ventral foci centered around
supramarginal gyrus, activated in bottom-up capture of atten-
tion, should come into play after retrieval. The Accumulator
model and the CoBRA account focus on the moment of retrieval
itself, for different reasons. The Output Buffer and Memory-to-
Action accounts relate ventral parietal activations to post-retrieval
processes, as should the Expectation account, since only after
retrieval can the mnemonic status of an item be compared with
one’s expectation.
Evaluating the accounts based on temporal features of exper-
imental data is challenging. Hemodynamic imaging does not
have the temporal resolution required for adjudicating these
claims, but EEG and magnetoencephalographic (MEG) studies
can address the issue. The most recent studies to relate to this
issue are those of Seibert and colleagues (2011a,b), in which MEG
was recorded during cued recall following pair associate learn-
ing. Seibert and colleagues report very early activity—beginning
within 100ms of a retrieval cue and resolving in less than
400ms—that distinguished correct living/non-living classifica-
tion of the studied pair member of a presented cue from parallel
correct classification of cues themselves. In their second study,
taking advantage of the spatial resolution afforded by MEG,
Seibert and colleagues (2011a) localize that activity to IPS. They
conclude that this finding of very early activation associated with
successful retrieval supports the AtoM account. It must be noted,
though, that the classification responses in the task employed by
Seibert and colleagues required retrieval of a limited type of gist
information, and do not require the retrieval of the actual iden-
tity of the target memorandum. It remains to be demonstrated
whether such early responses will characterize fuller episodic
retrieval. Furthermore, the temporal differences between the con-
ditions in that study were rather similar in IPL and SPL, contrary
to the dorsal/ventral, top-down/bottom-up attention dissociation
suggested by the AtoM account.
It is therefore instructive to examine earlier electrophysiolog-
ical studies of episodic retrieval, which served as the original
basis of claims for the existence of parietal mnemonic processes.
The discussion of event-related potentials recorded over parietal
scalp elicited in conjunction with successful recognition gener-
ally focuses on the 500–900ms time range (Allan and Rugg, 1997;
Friedman and Johnson, 2000; Rugg and Curran, 2007). The pari-
etal components reach their strongest voltages later than those
recorded over frontal scalp; they are also posited to reflect rec-
ollective richness in contrast to simple familiarity associated with
the frontal foci (Rugg and Curran, 2007), although the interpre-
tation of the frontal aspect is controversial (Voss and Federmeier,
2011). The question is whether that 500–900ms time window is
early or late, in the context of mnemonic processes. For example:
in a simple word recognition task, in which the mean response
time is 700ms, the old/new ERP difference peaks at 600ms on
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average, but extends from 400–900ms (Johnson et al., 1998);
can that ERP be conclusively identified as reflecting pre-retrieval,
retrieval or post-retrieval processes? Furthermore, several stud-
ies have documented a late posterior negativity which extends
several hundred ms after responses are made (e.g., Johansson
and Mecklinger, 2003; Friedman et al., 2005; Herron, 2007;
Mecklinger et al., 2007). This very robust activity, with old/new
voltage differences sometimes several times stronger than differ-
ences in the window of earlier old/new parietal differences, is
observed in tasks in which response conflict is potentially strong,
or when additional information about the encoding episode
(source memory) is to be retrieved. It may be argued that specifi-
cally those experimental conditions may serve as good models of
ecological remembering, in which information may subjected to
further analysis after its retrieval, in order to apply it to needs of
the situation in which the rememberer is functioning. This con-
trasts with the standard serial recognition judgment paradigm
in which activity is tracked in the laboratory, in which the task
characteristics encourage the participant to cease processing the
retrieved stimulus immediately after the recognition judgment in
order to be ready for the next trial.
Thus, EEG and MEG studies have documented several time
windows of parietal activation, which when taken together are
compatible with the temporal characteristics of all of the extant
accounts of parietal mnemonic activations. This suggests that
parietal activations may represent a number of cognitive func-
tions occurring during different epochs of retrieval processes,
modulated by task demands. The implication of this distribution
would be that several of the parietal mnemonic accounts might be
valuable for understanding the activations in question, and they
might therefore tile the time continuum rather than providing
conflicting explanatory alternatives.
Another approach to determining the assignment of activa-
tions to slots in the sequence of retrieval stages is offered by the
studies of Herron et al. (2004) and Vilberg and Rugg (2009).
They employ a manipulation of the relative probability of old
and new items in blocks of the test battery, for item recog-
nition in the former study and for source judgments in the
follow-up study. The assumption of that manipulation is that
“neural activity can only vary according to the relative probabil-
ity of old and new items after the items have been identified as
such” (Vilberg and Rugg, 2009), and modulation by probability
indexes post-retrieval processes, but not retrieval itself. Vilberg
and Rugg (2009) report that two superior parietal regions, one
anterior and one posterior to mid-IPS, showed such probability-
sensitive retrieval success effects. In contrast, source-retrieval-
related activations in ventral regions in the vicinity of AG and
mid-IPS activation irrespective of source accuracy were insensi-
tive to old/new probability differences. This represents a “process-
dissociation” approach to unraveling the temporal structure of
parietal mnemonic activations.
An extension of the temporal taxonomy is the question of
the relationship between parietal retrieval effects and parietal
encoding effects that have been investigated in other studies.
Notably, it has been reported that 85% of the positive subsequent
memory effects in the lateral PPC occurred in superior parietal
regions (in the IPS or BA 7 dorsal to it), while activation in more
ventral parietal areas during encoding predicts subsequent forget-
ting (reviewed by Uncapher and Wagner, 2009; Kim, 2011). This
distribution of effects has been explained in terms of attention:
top-down attention during encoding, supported by superior pari-
etal substrates, yields more effective encoding and better memory,
while the capture of attention by non-target stimuli in the envi-
ronment, or DMN-related mind wandering, leads to less effective
encoding and so to poorer subsequent memory (Uncapher and
Wagner, 2009; Kim, 2011). Such findings and explanations are
differentially challenging for the various accounts of retrieval
effects. In the accounts that assign parietal activations to atten-
tional or signal accumulator processes, parietal retrieval effects
may be completely orthogonal to encoding effects. However, the
contrast between the existence of retrieval success and the lack of
subsequent memory effects in AG is a challenge to the CoBRA
account, and to the Output Buffer hypothesis as well. If pari-
etal mnemonic activations at retrieval reflect memory contents
rather thanmemory processes, wemight expect greater encoding-
retrieval overlap than is reported. This would certainly be the
case according to the view that an act of remembering, especially
episodic remembering, consists of the coordinated reactivation
of sensory/perceptual regions that were activated at the time
of encoding (e.g., Squire, 1987; Wheeler et al., 2000). Studies
using fMRI have provided evidence supporting this reactiva-
tion/reinstatement hypothesis (e.g., Johnson and Rugg, 2007; Kim
et al., 2010; and other studies reviewed by Danker and Anderson,
2010). If AG plays a content role, as suggested by CoBRA, we
should expect to find encoding-retrieval overlap. However, this
has not been reported; indeed, in one study, higher-levels of AG
activation during the presentation of task-irrelevant face pictures
were correlated with subsequent failure to recognize those faces
(Minamoto et al., 2012). That heightened activation in ventral
parietal regions during encoding leads to subsequently poorer
memory is in accordance with the AtoM account: because items to
be encoded are ostensibly in the focus of attention, during encod-
ing there is typically no need for attention reorienting. Thus,
VPC activity at encoding may reflect bottom-up attention to task-
irrelevant stimuli or thoughts, and hence predict encoding failure
(Daselaar et al., 2009).
An additional temporal frame issue poses another challenge
to one feature of the CoBRA account. According to CoBRA
(Shimamura, 2011), AG is especially important for supporting
consolidated episodic representations, which at an earlier stage in
their lifespan are more dependent on the hippocampus. Such sys-
tems consolidation (Dudai, 2004) of memory from initial medial
temporal lobe representations to posterior cortical substrates has
indeed been posited by many memory theories. However, the
time frame of systems consolidation in humans may range from
days to decades—while AG activations during retrieval have been
reported when retrieval follows encoding by less than an hour.
This seems to be problematic for that aspect of the CoBRA
hypothesis.
VERIDICAL OR ASSERTED MEMORY?
The various accounts of parietal mnemonic activations may also
be assessed on the basis of howwell they fit in with the reports that
lateral parietal activity is correlated with the subjective impression
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that an item is old, such that it is found in false alarms more than
in correct rejections (Wheeler and Buckner, 2003; Kahn et al.,
2004; Shannon and Buckner, 2004; Wagner et al., 2005). This
is most problematic for the CoBRA account, since that proposal
relates the activations to the existence of representations in cor-
tex, which theoretically should not exist for foil probes. Subjective
memory activations require the AtoM account to incorporate the
capture of attention not by mnemonic representations themselves
(since there are no such representation in the case of false alarms)
but by the cues that are used to probe it. It also requires the
Accumulator hypothesis to accept that the signal cannot be the
raw comparison of probe to representation, but rather the out-
put of an earlier process that has already made that comparison,
and requires the Output Buffer hypothesis to allow the storage in
the buffer of a probe-related representation rather than retrieved
information alone. The activation by subjective judgment is least
problematic for the Memory-to-Action hypothesis, as it posits that
a post-retrieval-decision trace is what is held in a buffer for fur-
ther processing, whether it is veridically old or not. It is notable
in this regard that neuropsychological findings have led some
researchers to suggest that parietal cortex does not directly par-
ticipate in retrieval, and instead reflects the subjective experience
of recollection (Ally et al., 2008).
In a related vein, O’Connor and colleagues (2010), using a
Posner cueing paradigm adapted for a recognition memory, show
that ventral parietal activation (in both the AG and supramarginal
gyrus) is more sensitive to expectation of whether an item would
be old or new than to whether it was actually old or new. Such
expectation judgments are theoretically orthogonal to the veracity
of the mnemonic judgment. However, the trial-by-trial cueing in
that study changes the cognitive nature of the task, and focuses the
participant on constant evaluation of the cue-stimulus relation-
ship, and therefore it is uncertain whether that pattern of findings
readily generalizes to ordinary retrieval task processes.
QUANTITY, QUALITY, OR STRENGTH?
It has been observed that “AG retrieval-related activity has
been reported to covary with the amount of information recol-
lected” (Hayama et al., 2012), supporting a content approach to
understanding such activations. However, determining whether
particular experimental conditions yield differences in ecphoric
quantity or quality is not trivial. For example, Guerin and Miller
(2011) describes the difference between memory for stimuli pre-
sented 1–2 times and stimuli presented 5–6 times as being “the
amount of information recollected,” and suggests interpreting
recognition-related activations which they found in AG accord-
ingly. But does stimulus repetition necessarily lead to quantitative
information differences? Even if repetition increases the likeli-
hood of recognition (and therefore of measures of performance
such as percent correct scores), it may not increase the amount of
information available for each individual recognized stimulus. Of
course, interpretation of repetition effects is a function of what
one means by the “amount of information.” If one is given the
task of remembering object pictures, e.g., successful encoding of
the name of the object or basic aspects of its appearance would
enable recognition in contrast to foils that are other objects, but
not necessarily in contrast to foils that are minimally modified
versions of the original object. The additional details required for
the latter task might best capture the idea of “amount of infor-
mation” about a recognition target, and their acquisition might
be a function of repetition. This does not seem to have been
investigated.
Suzuki and colleagues (2011) employed encoding repetitions,
but understand them as affecting memory strength rather than
quantity of information. They conducted fMRI while partici-
pants made responses indexing the initial, second, third or fourth
appearance of object pictures. They report that while mid-IPS
activation increased linearly with the degree of repetition, no such
effect was found in more ventral parietal areas. They interpret
that absence of activation as possible evidence that the repeat-
edly presented items elicited little or no recollection. However,
the authors do not report whether retrieval success effects were
not found at all in VPC, or whether they were found, but not
repetition-graded.
Another approach to operationalizing memory strength is
based on ratings of confidence in mnemonic judgments. Hayes
and colleagues (2011) contrasted differences in confidence during
tasks requiring item or source retrieval, and report that parietal
mnemonic activity tracked confidence ratings, with dorsal areas
showing low-confidence activity and anterior ventral areas in the
vicinity of BA 40 showing high-confidence activity in both tasks.
This finding is offered in support of the AtoM account.
Turning to qualitative distinctions, source memory retrieval
success is often offered as evidence for qualitative differences
in memory processes (e.g., within a dual-process framework;
Yonelinas, 2002). However, source memory judgments employed
in parietal mnemonic studies are generally binary (e.g., which
task—pleasantness or concreteness judgment—was used for
encoding this stimulus? Did this stimulus previously appear on
the right or left of the screen? Was it presented in red or in
green?). Few studies provide multiple opportunities to retrieve
information about the encoding episode—which could provide
a quantitative rather than qualitative characterization of memory
for retrieval incident.
Furthermore, and in connection with the above-mentioned
proposal that AGmight serve as a convergence zone for exogenous
recognition probe perceptual inputs in order to allow compar-
isons of perceived and retrieved representations, is a key and often
overlooked point regarding experimental studies of recognition.
Although they are sometimes purported as being able to disso-
ciate familiarity from recollection (Yonelinas, 2002), recognition
tests are nevertheless invariably tests of contextual recognition,
which is problematic for the assessment of familiarity. Certainly in
recognition tests employing verbal materials, and even for recog-
nition tests using novel visual or auditory stimuli, participants are
seldom if ever asked if a probe stimulus is at all familiar—whether
they have ever experienced it at any point in the past. Invariably,
the test question always is: Did you experience this stimulus in
the encoding episode? Thus, the standard recognition memory
experiment does not identify processes supporting simple famil-
iarity, but rather processes enabling the linkage of a stimulus
with a particular spatio-temporal context. Context is a multisen-
sory entity; accordingly, if AG provides a multimodal convergence
zone, it has added value for recognition not in representation of
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the probe or target stimulus, but vis-à-vis the context in which it
was experienced. Therefore, remember-know response types may
index differences in degree of memory strength rather than in
categorical differences.
LATERALIZED OR BILATERAL?
Two domains have been noted in which lateralization of parietal
mnemonic activations require consideration: material type speci-
ficity (e.g., verbal vs. visual stimuli) and retrieval-type specificity
(recognition vs. cued recall).
Left-lateralized PPC activity has been observed for non-
verbal information (faces) and non-visual information (Guerin
and Miller, 2009), words, pictures, and sounds (Shannon and
Buckner, 2004). It should be noted that the effect lateraliza-
tion may be relative, as a function of the activation threshold
selected for report. For example, in Shannon and Buckner (2004),
parallel (albeit weaker) activations are reported in the right pari-
etal areas activations for the same stimuli that activated the left
hemisphere. For non-Western, non-verbal music clips assumed
to be encoded and represented primarily by higher-order audi-
tory regions in the right-hemisphere successful retrieval effects
were observed only in the right PPC (Klostermann et al., 2009).
It is possible that the dominance of left-lateralized effects reflects
the use of left hemisphere verbal or semantic retrieval processes
(Shimamura, 2011), perhaps even for materials such as faces,
for which right-hemisphere perceptual representations are dom-
inant, but for which descriptive heuristics may be employed as
part of a recognition strategy.
Left lateralization of ventral parietal activations is problem-
atic for the AtoM account, as much recent evidence indicates
that non-spatial attentional abilities such as detection of behav-
iorally relevant and novel stimuli and reorienting to stimuli in
either visual field that are presented outside the focus of atten-
tion (stimulus-driven reorienting) recruit a right lateralized ven-
tral attention network (Corbetta and Shulman, 2011). It would
therefore be expected that reorienting of attention to retrieved
information on the basis of its salience (Cabeza et al., 2008, 2011)
would lead to stronger right-hemisphere activations, irrespective
of material type. Content accounts of parietal mnemonic activa-
tions are more compatible with material-specific or semantically
driven lateralization.
In contrast to the left-lateralization of parietal recognition-
related activations, event-related potential, and hemodynamic
imaging studies of cued recall sometimes report more bilater-
ally distributed parietal activations (e.g., EEG: Allan et al., 1996;
Allan and Rugg, 1997, but not Donaldson and Rugg, 1999; fMRI:
Schott et al., 2005; Hayama et al., 2012 but not de Zubicaray et al.,
2007), and we have found this to be the case for EEG recorded in
conjunction with cued recall following audio-visual pair associate
learning as well (Levy, unpublished data). This might account
for the finding by Davidson et al. (2008) that in patients with
PPC lesions (four left- and one right-hemisphere lesions), impair-
ment was observed on an old/new recognition test and patients
offered fewer “remember” and more “know” responses than did
controls. In contrast, the patients were not significantly impaired
on the cued recall or source memory tests. Since cued recall has
been reported to have a more bilateral activation distribution,
compensation by the intact hemisphere might have been more
effective specifically for that task. As noted by Hayama et al.
(2012), this distribution might also explain the lesion data of
Simons et al. (2010).
COGNITIVE CONTROL, SELECTIVE ATTENTION, OR DEFAULT
MODE?
Default mode
An important recent concept in cognitive neuroscience is the
functional parcellation of the brain into networks supporting
externally oriented active perception and goal-directed cognition
and networks supporting internally oriented mentation, with the
latter often referred to as the (DMN; Raichle et al., 2001). Noting
the overlap between membership of the parietal aspects of the
“retrieval success network”—AG, posterior cingulate cortex, and
the precuneus—and their membership in DMN, Kim (2012) sug-
gests that the optimal approach to understanding retrieval-related
activations in AG is in terms of its belonging to DMN. Similarly,
Kim (2012) suggests that the dorsal parietal mnemonic activa-
tions should be understood in terms of those areas being part of
the cognitive control network, along with a range of prefrontal
regions.
However, some recent findings seem to vitiate the explana-
tory power of the default mode account for AG-focused old-new
effects. In a study by Sestieri et al. (2011), participants per-
formed cued recollection of details of previously movie scenes,
arguably a strong model of ecological recollection. They report
dissociation within the DMN areas between AG which was impli-
cated in such retrieval processes, and mPFC, which was not so
involved. Similarly, Suzuki et al. (2011) report dissociation in
repetition effects between the precuneus, which like IPS showed
graded increase with repetition, and hippocampus and retrosple-
nial/posterior cingulate cortex, which showed a graded decrease
of activation. Reas et al. (2011) report that in the course of
attempted recall of strongly and (especially of) poorly remem-
bered word-pair associates, participants exhibited deactivation in
left inferior parietal lobe in the vicinity of AG (along with anterior
hippocampus and other aspects of DMN). This is very much the
opposite of what might be expected on the basis of prior stud-
ies that report that the degree of AG activation increases with
greater recollective strength, from a form of retrieval that would
seem to require the greatest degree of recollection. Furthermore,
in an experiment that tracked the effects of word study-test lag
on retrieval-related activations, Buchsbaum et al. (2011) found
that both a medio-lateral inferior parietal area that showed
decreasing activation with longer lag, and an anterior temporal-
parietal region abutting the Sylvian fissure implicated in basic
verbal working memory rehearsal, were functionally and anatom-
ically dissociable from a third, more posteriorly situated, parietal
area identified with DMN. Such divergent dissociations seem
to indicate that explanations of lateral parietal activations sim-
ply in terms of general DMN processes may not be an effective
approach.
Cognitive control
Consideration of the second putative network implicated in pari-
etal mnemonic activations, which Kim (2012) labels the cognitive
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control network, intuitively brings to mind the AtoM hypothe-
sis (Cabeza et al., 2008, 2011; Ciaramelli et al., 2008, 2010). That
account posits that dorsal parietal activations reflect allocation of
attention to memory search. Understandably, to the extent that
superior parietal lobes are a substrate of top-down attention pro-
cesses (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002, 2011), it is to be expected
that just as in any cognitive process, attending to the task will
bring greater chances of its successful execution. This proposal is
supported by findings that more challenging instances of success-
ful recognition—e.g., recognition judgments which are identified
as reflecting familiarity rather than recollection, or those with
low-confidence—are more likely to be associated with superior
parietal activations than recollective, high-confidence, ostensi-
bly less effortful recognition. Additionally, DPC activity has been
found to decrease across repeated retrieval attempts (Kuhl et al.,
2007).
Recently, Ciaramelli et al. (2010) have noted that dorsal pari-
etal activations—specifically in the IPS—are associated with trials
in which probes are preceded by cues that could initiate retrieval
before probe presentation. However, in that study, the cues were
all studied words in themselves, so the evidence accruing from it
that activation reflected orienting rather than automatic retrieval
is equivocal.
Counter to the AtoM claims that dorsal parietal activations
are purely attentional is the integrative analysis reported by
Hutchinson et al. (2009), indicating that foci of dorsal parietal
activation in studies of recognition do not completely over-
lap the foci of activations from studies of visual attention and
working memory. Hutchinson and colleagues report that top-
down attention foci are mostly to be found in the medial bank
and posterior portion of IPS, and in SPL, while retrieval suc-
cess activations lie lateral to most attentional foci. However,
Hutchinson and colleagues acknowledge that divergencemay rep-
resent the specific types of visual-spatial attentional foci that
they compiled for comparison, whereas recognition memory
tasks might recruit slightly different attentional processes. A
recent specific examination of the dorsal parietal activations
by Sestieri and colleagues (2010), in which retrieving remem-
bered details of a viewed video clip was contrasted within
subjects with perceptual search of the same kinds of details,
yielded IPS activations that not only did not overlap, but actu-
ally suggested competition between attentional and mnemonic
processes.
There are, of course, other cognitive processes other than
purely attentional ones with which dorsal parietal mnemonic
activations might be linked. Kim (2012) notes that across stud-
ies, components of the cognitive control network are activated
more strongly by instances of source retrieval than of item
retrieval. Among the possible reasons for that difference is the
fact source memory judgments are generally made between two
alternatives. A generate and test approach can be used in order
to weigh the relative similarity of each of the possible repre-
sentations compared with a stored representation. Thus, source
judgments may use working memory, in which superior pari-
etal cortex is strongly implicated (Wager and Smith, 2003) to
represent the alternatives and judge between them, while in
item recognition the entire probe is perceptually available until
judgment.
Another cognitive controldistinction, suggestedbyKim(2012),
is that iterative searches and verification of retrieved information
may engage more consistently during a hit than during a correct
rejection of an unstudied probe. However, it seems that at least
iterative searches must be more part of the correct rejection
process than of the recognition hit process, just as in visual
search tasks reports of target presence must be faster on the
average than reports of absence. An alternative is provided by
the Expectation account, based on the study of Herron et al.
(2004), who showed that areas implicated in cognitive control,
but not default mode areas, retrieval success effects decreased or
even reversed when old/new stimulus ratios increased from 25
to 75% of the test probes. Sensitivity to probability reflects an
executive function/cognitive control account which is applicable
not just tomemory judgments, but to perceptual decision-making
in general, as indicated by the study of Ploran et al. (2007). The
involvement of such processes in mnemonic judgments and their
independence from purely selective attention processes may be
related to the report of Vincent and colleagues (2008) of three
networks dissociated by resting-state connectivity, which they
identify as representing dorsal attention, fronto-parietal control,
and hippocampal-corticalmemory systems. These systems occupy
a progressively superior-rostral to inferior-dorsal swath along
lateral parietal cortex. The fronto-parietal control aspect of these
networksseemstooverlay theconvergencemapsofretrieval success
and recollection effects provided by Hutchinson and colleagues
(2009). It therefore seems appropriate to conduct additional
parietal mnemonic studies tracking the impact of the range of
factors implicated in strategic “working-with-memory” processes
on activations in the midrange parietal areas directly inferior to
mid-IPS.
Selective attention
The AtoM account’s attempt to interpret ventral parietal activa-
tions in terms of attentional processes—as representing “reorient-
ing of attention to internal representations”—seems somewhat
more problematic than the attentional account of dorsal parietal
activations. In the integrative analysis of Hutchinson and col-
leagues (2009), the divergence between memory- and attention-
related activations in ventral PPC is quite strong. More recent
studies with a higher spatial resolution (e.g., Sestieri et al., 2011)
confirm that lack of concordance. The real difficulty with the
AtoM account, though, is conceptual.Whatmight it mean “to ori-
ent attention toward internal representations” in the context of a
probe-driven recognition task? Ciaramelli et al. (2010) frame the
AtoM claim by focusing on non-cued and invalidly cued recog-
nition trials (i.e., recombined pairs), for which activation was
found in the AG. However, that operationalization may not cap-
ture orienting, but rather the need for recollective processes that
are recruited for recognition of a probe when it is not supported
by its study context (Tibon et al., 2012).
In a recent study, Cabeza and colleagues (2011), attempted
to address the attention-mnemonic foci overlap discrepancies,
and address the conceptual issue of nature of orienting in the
context of retrieval. Participants learned progressive word-pair
chains constructed on the basis of serial semantic associations.
They then were presented with the initial word of such a chain
and asked to recall the second member of the third linked pair
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in that chain. This retrieval condition was contrasted with a task
of similar duration, in which participants monitored a stream of
letters and noted the appearance of a vowel. The authors pro-
pose that the initial stimulus in each case requires orienting to
the task case, while the appearance of the vowel target or the
retrieval of the target word were both incidents of detection.
Overlapping (but not identical) activations were found in dor-
sal parietal regions for the orienting aspects of both tasks, while
overlapping activations in ventral parietal regions were associ-
ated with the detection phases. Furthermore, in ROI analyses,
the parietal areas showing greater mnemonic detection activa-
tion were functionally connected with MTL, while those showing
greater perceptual detection activation were functionally con-
nected with visual areas. Cabeza and colleagues (2011) argue that
these findings suggest that ventral parietal activations associated
with target detection are attentional in nature. However, in this
paradigm, detection is stressed at the expense of retrieval. Since
the target word was the third retrieval in a chain, it was char-
acterized not only by retrieval processes (in which functional
connectivity with MTL is appropriate) but by the fact that a tar-
get was identified. Significantly, the authors note that the ventral
parietal activations did not differentiate between successful and
unsuccessful retrieval when examined in a whole-brain analy-
sis. This contrasts with the cases in which studied stimuli yield
ventral parietal activations even when they are not the cases to
be endorsed (Shannon and Buckner, 2004; Donaldson et al.,
2010). Therefore, that study does not necessarily aid character-
ization of the specifically mnemonic processes in which ventral
parietal areas are implicated. Accordingly, the intriguing concept
of orienting to internal representation seems to require further
explication.
CONCLUSION
As we have seen, despite the wealth of studies that have been con-
ducted about lateral parietal involvement in long-term episodic
memory, uncertainties still abound. Some of the accounts
mentioned above maintain that there is nothing specifically
mnemonic about parietal activations, but rather that they reflect
general purpose attentional or control processes that can sup-
port a wide range of cognitive abilities. In other accounts, parietal
activations during episodic retrieval are held to reflect aspects
of perceptual representation. The interpretive dichotomies of the
preceding sections are offered as a heuristic for consideration of
the wealth of evidence that has become available regarding this
issue. Considered synoptically, they suggest that future research
should be oriented toward revealing the mosaic of dimensions
characterizing parietal mnemonic processes: delineating subar-
eas (including laterality) and time windows; expanding the range
of material types examined; and most importantly—using more
ecological assays of memory that can reveal the complex cognitive
interactions that may characterize the intersection of percep-
tual, attentional, mnemonic, and action processes that represent
parietal contributions to remembering.
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